/* Copyright (c) 2021, Google Inc. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_MSAN) #define NO_SANITIZE_MEMORY __attribute__((no_sanitize("memory"))) #else #define NO_SANITIZE_MEMORY #endif BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN // ECH reuses the extension code point for the version number. static const uint16_t kECHConfigVersion = TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello; static const decltype(&EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm) kSupportedAEADs[] = { &EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm, &EVP_hpke_aes_256_gcm, &EVP_hpke_chacha20_poly1305, }; static const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *get_ech_aead(uint16_t aead_id) { for (const auto aead_func : kSupportedAEADs) { const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = aead_func(); if (aead_id == EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead)) { return aead; } } return nullptr; } // ssl_client_hello_write_without_extensions serializes |client_hello| into // |out|, omitting the length-prefixed extensions. It serializes individual // fields, starting with |client_hello->version|, and ignores the // |client_hello->client_hello| field. It returns true on success and false on // failure. static bool ssl_client_hello_write_without_extensions( const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, CBB *out) { CBB cbb; if (!CBB_add_u16(out, client_hello->version) || !CBB_add_bytes(out, client_hello->random, client_hello->random_len) || !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(out, &cbb) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &cbb) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, client_hello->cipher_suites, client_hello->cipher_suites_len) || !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(out, &cbb) || !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, client_hello->compression_methods, client_hello->compression_methods_len) || !CBB_flush(out)) { return false; } return true; } bool ssl_decode_client_hello_inner( SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, Array *out_client_hello_inner, Span encoded_client_hello_inner, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer) { SSL_CLIENT_HELLO client_hello_inner; if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello_inner, encoded_client_hello_inner)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } // TLS 1.3 ClientHellos must have extensions, and EncodedClientHelloInners use // ClientHelloOuter's session_id. if (client_hello_inner.extensions_len == 0 || client_hello_inner.session_id_len != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } client_hello_inner.session_id = client_hello_outer->session_id; client_hello_inner.session_id_len = client_hello_outer->session_id_len; // Begin serializing a message containing the ClientHelloInner in |cbb|. ScopedCBB cbb; CBB body, extensions; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || !ssl_client_hello_write_without_extensions(&client_hello_inner, &body) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } // Sort the extensions in ClientHelloOuter, so ech_outer_extensions may be // processed in O(n*log(n)) time, rather than O(n^2). struct Extension { uint16_t extension = 0; Span body; bool copied = false; }; // MSan's libc interceptors do not handle |bsearch|. See b/182583130. auto compare_extension = [](const void *a, const void *b) NO_SANITIZE_MEMORY -> int { const Extension *extension_a = reinterpret_cast(a); const Extension *extension_b = reinterpret_cast(b); if (extension_a->extension < extension_b->extension) { return -1; } else if (extension_a->extension > extension_b->extension) { return 1; } return 0; }; GrowableArray sorted_extensions; CBS unsorted_extensions(MakeConstSpan(client_hello_outer->extensions, client_hello_outer->extensions_len)); while (CBS_len(&unsorted_extensions) > 0) { Extension extension; CBS extension_body; if (!CBS_get_u16(&unsorted_extensions, &extension.extension) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&unsorted_extensions, &extension_body)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } extension.body = extension_body; if (!sorted_extensions.Push(extension)) { return false; } } qsort(sorted_extensions.data(), sorted_extensions.size(), sizeof(Extension), compare_extension); // Copy extensions from |client_hello_inner|, expanding ech_outer_extensions. CBS inner_extensions(MakeConstSpan(client_hello_inner.extensions, client_hello_inner.extensions_len)); while (CBS_len(&inner_extensions) > 0) { uint16_t extension_id; CBS extension_body; if (!CBS_get_u16(&inner_extensions, &extension_id) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&inner_extensions, &extension_body)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } if (extension_id != TLSEXT_TYPE_ech_outer_extensions) { if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, extension_id) || !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, CBS_len(&extension_body)) || !CBB_add_bytes(&extensions, CBS_data(&extension_body), CBS_len(&extension_body))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } continue; } // Replace ech_outer_extensions with the corresponding outer extensions. CBS outer_extensions; if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension_body, &outer_extensions) || CBS_len(&extension_body) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } while (CBS_len(&outer_extensions) > 0) { uint16_t extension_needed; if (!CBS_get_u16(&outer_extensions, &extension_needed)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } if (extension_needed == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } // Find the referenced extension. Extension key; key.extension = extension_needed; Extension *result = reinterpret_cast( bsearch(&key, sorted_extensions.data(), sorted_extensions.size(), sizeof(Extension), compare_extension)); if (result == nullptr) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } // Extensions may be referenced at most once, to bound the result size. if (result->copied) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_EXTENSION); return false; } result->copied = true; if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, extension_needed) || !CBB_add_u16(&extensions, result->body.size()) || !CBB_add_bytes(&extensions, result->body.data(), result->body.size())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } } } if (!CBB_flush(&body)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } // See https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/pull/411 CBS extension; if (!ssl_client_hello_init(ssl, &client_hello_inner, MakeConstSpan(CBB_data(&body), CBB_len(&body))) || !ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello_inner, &extension, TLSEXT_TYPE_ech_is_inner) || CBS_len(&extension) != 0 || ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello_inner, &extension, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello) || !ssl_client_hello_get_extension(&client_hello_inner, &extension, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER); return false; } // Parse supported_versions and reject TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3. Older // versions are incompatible with ECH. CBS versions; if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &versions) || CBS_len(&extension) != 0 || // CBS_len(&versions) == 0) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } while (CBS_len(&versions) != 0) { uint16_t version; if (!CBS_get_u16(&versions, &version)) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } if (version == SSL3_VERSION || version == TLS1_VERSION || version == TLS1_1_VERSION || version == TLS1_2_VERSION || version == DTLS1_VERSION || version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) { *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_CLIENT_HELLO_INNER); return false; } } if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), out_client_hello_inner)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } return true; } bool ssl_client_hello_decrypt( EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke_ctx, Array *out_encoded_client_hello_inner, bool *out_is_decrypt_error, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id, const uint8_t config_id, Span enc, Span payload) { *out_is_decrypt_error = false; // Compute the ClientHello portion of the ClientHelloOuterAAD value. See // draft-ietf-tls-esni-10, section 5.2. ScopedCBB aad; CBB enc_cbb, outer_hello_cbb, extensions_cbb; if (!CBB_init(aad.get(), 256) || !CBB_add_u16(aad.get(), kdf_id) || !CBB_add_u16(aad.get(), aead_id) || !CBB_add_u8(aad.get(), config_id) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(aad.get(), &enc_cbb) || !CBB_add_bytes(&enc_cbb, enc.data(), enc.size()) || !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(aad.get(), &outer_hello_cbb) || !ssl_client_hello_write_without_extensions(client_hello_outer, &outer_hello_cbb) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&outer_hello_cbb, &extensions_cbb)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } CBS extensions(MakeConstSpan(client_hello_outer->extensions, client_hello_outer->extensions_len)); while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) { uint16_t extension_id; CBS extension_body; if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_id) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension_body)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } if (extension_id == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello) { continue; } if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions_cbb, extension_id) || !CBB_add_u16(&extensions_cbb, CBS_len(&extension_body)) || !CBB_add_bytes(&extensions_cbb, CBS_data(&extension_body), CBS_len(&extension_body))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } } if (!CBB_flush(aad.get())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) // In fuzzer mode, disable encryption to improve coverage. We reserve a short // input to signal decryption failure, so the fuzzer can explore fallback to // ClientHelloOuter. const uint8_t kBadPayload[] = {0xff}; if (payload == kBadPayload) { *out_is_decrypt_error = true; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); return false; } if (!out_encoded_client_hello_inner->CopyFrom(payload)) { return false; } #else // Attempt to decrypt into |out_encoded_client_hello_inner|. if (!out_encoded_client_hello_inner->Init(payload.size())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } size_t encoded_client_hello_inner_len; if (!EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(hpke_ctx, out_encoded_client_hello_inner->data(), &encoded_client_hello_inner_len, out_encoded_client_hello_inner->size(), payload.data(), payload.size(), CBB_data(aad.get()), CBB_len(aad.get()))) { *out_is_decrypt_error = true; OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); return false; } out_encoded_client_hello_inner->Shrink(encoded_client_hello_inner_len); #endif return true; } static bool parse_ipv4_number(Span in, uint32_t *out) { // See https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#ipv4-number-parser. uint32_t base = 10; if (in.size() >= 2 && in[0] == '0' && (in[1] == 'x' || in[1] == 'X')) { in = in.subspan(2); base = 16; } else if (in.size() >= 1 && in[0] == '0') { in = in.subspan(1); base = 8; } *out = 0; for (uint8_t c : in) { uint32_t d; if ('0' <= c && c <= '9') { d = c - '0'; } else if ('a' <= c && c <= 'f') { d = c - 'a' + 10; } else if ('A' <= c && c <= 'F') { d = c - 'A' + 10; } else { return false; } if (d >= base || *out > UINT32_MAX / base) { return false; } *out *= base; if (*out > UINT32_MAX - d) { return false; } *out += d; } return true; } static bool is_ipv4_address(Span in) { // See https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-ipv4-parser uint32_t numbers[4]; size_t num_numbers = 0; while (!in.empty()) { if (num_numbers == 4) { // Too many components. return false; } // Find the next dot-separated component. auto dot = std::find(in.begin(), in.end(), '.'); if (dot == in.begin()) { // Empty components are not allowed. return false; } Span component; if (dot == in.end()) { component = in; in = Span(); } else { component = in.subspan(0, dot - in.begin()); in = in.subspan(dot - in.begin() + 1); // Skip the dot. } if (!parse_ipv4_number(component, &numbers[num_numbers])) { return false; } num_numbers++; } if (num_numbers == 0) { return false; } for (size_t i = 0; i < num_numbers - 1; i++) { if (numbers[i] > 255) { return false; } } return num_numbers == 1 || numbers[num_numbers - 1] < 1u << (8 * (5 - num_numbers)); } bool ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(Span public_name) { // See draft-ietf-tls-esni-11, Section 4 and RFC5890, Section 2.3.1. The // public name must be a dot-separated sequence of LDH labels and not begin or // end with a dot. auto copy = public_name; if (copy.empty()) { return false; } while (!copy.empty()) { // Find the next dot-separated component. auto dot = std::find(copy.begin(), copy.end(), '.'); Span component; if (dot == copy.end()) { component = copy; copy = Span(); } else { component = copy.subspan(0, dot - copy.begin()); copy = copy.subspan(dot - copy.begin() + 1); // Skip the dot. if (copy.empty()) { // Trailing dots are not allowed. return false; } } // |component| must be a valid LDH label. Checking for empty components also // rejects leading dots. if (component.empty() || component.size() > 63 || component.front() == '-' || component.back() == '-') { return false; } for (uint8_t c : component) { if (!('a' <= c && c <= 'z') && !('A' <= c && c <= 'Z') && !('0' <= c && c <= '9') && c != '-') { return false; } } } return !is_ipv4_address(public_name); } static bool parse_ech_config(CBS *cbs, ECHConfig *out, bool *out_supported, bool all_extensions_mandatory) { uint16_t version; CBS orig = *cbs; CBS contents; if (!CBS_get_u16(cbs, &version) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &contents)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } if (version != kECHConfigVersion) { *out_supported = false; return true; } // Make a copy of the ECHConfig and parse from it, so the results alias into // the saved copy. if (!out->raw.CopyFrom( MakeConstSpan(CBS_data(&orig), CBS_len(&orig) - CBS_len(cbs)))) { return false; } CBS ech_config(out->raw); CBS public_name, public_key, cipher_suites, extensions; if (!CBS_skip(&ech_config, 2) || // version !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&ech_config, &contents) || !CBS_get_u8(&contents, &out->config_id) || !CBS_get_u16(&contents, &out->kem_id) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &public_key) || CBS_len(&public_key) == 0 || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &cipher_suites) || CBS_len(&cipher_suites) == 0 || CBS_len(&cipher_suites) % 4 != 0 || !CBS_get_u16(&contents, &out->maximum_name_length) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &public_name) || CBS_len(&public_name) == 0 || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &extensions) || CBS_len(&contents) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } if (!ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(public_name)) { // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): The draft says ECHConfigs with // invalid public names should be ignored, but LDH syntax failures are // unambiguously invalid. *out_supported = false; return true; } out->public_key = public_key; out->public_name = public_name; // This function does not ensure |out->kem_id| and |out->cipher_suites| use // supported algorithms. The caller must do this. out->cipher_suites = cipher_suites; bool has_unknown_mandatory_extension = false; while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { uint16_t type; CBS body; if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &body)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } // We currently do not support any extensions. if (type & 0x8000 || all_extensions_mandatory) { // Extension numbers with the high bit set are mandatory. Continue parsing // to enforce syntax, but we will ultimately ignore this ECHConfig as a // client and reject it as a server. has_unknown_mandatory_extension = true; } } *out_supported = !has_unknown_mandatory_extension; return true; } bool ECHServerConfig::Init(Span ech_config, const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key, bool is_retry_config) { is_retry_config_ = is_retry_config; // Parse the ECHConfig, rejecting all unsupported parameters and extensions. // Unlike most server options, ECH's server configuration is serialized and // configured in both the server and DNS. If the caller configures an // unsupported parameter, this is a deployment error. To catch these errors, // we fail early. CBS cbs = ech_config; bool supported; if (!parse_ech_config(&cbs, &ech_config_, &supported, /*all_extensions_mandatory=*/true)) { return false; } if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } if (!supported) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG); return false; } CBS cipher_suites = ech_config_.cipher_suites; while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) { uint16_t kdf_id, aead_id; if (!CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &kdf_id) || !CBS_get_u16(&cipher_suites, &aead_id)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return false; } // The server promises to support every option in the ECHConfig, so reject // any unsupported cipher suites. if (kdf_id != EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256 || get_ech_aead(aead_id) == nullptr) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG); return false; } } // Check the public key in the ECHConfig matches |key|. uint8_t expected_public_key[EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH]; size_t expected_public_key_len; if (!EVP_HPKE_KEY_public_key(key, expected_public_key, &expected_public_key_len, sizeof(expected_public_key))) { return false; } if (ech_config_.kem_id != EVP_HPKE_KEM_id(EVP_HPKE_KEY_kem(key)) || MakeConstSpan(expected_public_key, expected_public_key_len) != ech_config_.public_key) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_CONFIG_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH); return false; } if (!EVP_HPKE_KEY_copy(key_.get(), key)) { return false; } return true; } bool ECHServerConfig::SetupContext(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id, Span enc) const { // Check the cipher suite is supported by this ECHServerConfig. CBS cbs(ech_config_.cipher_suites); bool cipher_ok = false; while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { uint16_t supported_kdf_id, supported_aead_id; if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &supported_kdf_id) || !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &supported_aead_id)) { return false; } if (kdf_id == supported_kdf_id && aead_id == supported_aead_id) { cipher_ok = true; break; } } if (!cipher_ok) { return false; } static const uint8_t kInfoLabel[] = "tls ech"; ScopedCBB info_cbb; if (!CBB_init(info_cbb.get(), sizeof(kInfoLabel) + ech_config_.raw.size()) || !CBB_add_bytes(info_cbb.get(), kInfoLabel, sizeof(kInfoLabel) /* includes trailing NUL */) || !CBB_add_bytes(info_cbb.get(), ech_config_.raw.data(), ech_config_.raw.size())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } assert(kdf_id == EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256); assert(get_ech_aead(aead_id) != NULL); return EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_recipient( ctx, key_.get(), EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(), get_ech_aead(aead_id), enc.data(), enc.size(), CBB_data(info_cbb.get()), CBB_len(info_cbb.get())); } bool ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list(Span ech_config_list) { CBS cbs = ech_config_list, child; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &child) || // CBS_len(&child) == 0 || // CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) { return false; } while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { ECHConfig ech_config; bool supported; if (!parse_ech_config(&child, &ech_config, &supported, /*all_extensions_mandatory=*/false)) { return false; } } return true; } static bool select_ech_cipher_suite(const EVP_HPKE_KDF **out_kdf, const EVP_HPKE_AEAD **out_aead, Span cipher_suites) { const bool has_aes_hardware = EVP_has_aes_hardware(); const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = nullptr; CBS cbs = cipher_suites; while (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { uint16_t kdf_id, aead_id; if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &kdf_id) || // !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &aead_id)) { return false; } // Pick the first common cipher suite, but prefer ChaCha20-Poly1305 if we // don't have AES hardware. const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *candidate = get_ech_aead(aead_id); if (kdf_id != EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256 || candidate == nullptr) { continue; } if (aead == nullptr || (!has_aes_hardware && aead_id == EVP_HPKE_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) { aead = candidate; } } if (aead == nullptr) { return false; } *out_kdf = EVP_hpke_hkdf_sha256(); *out_aead = aead; return true; } bool ssl_select_ech_config(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span out_enc, size_t *out_enc_len) { *out_enc_len = 0; if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) { // ECH requires TLS 1.3. return true; } if (!hs->config->client_ech_config_list.empty()) { CBS cbs = MakeConstSpan(hs->config->client_ech_config_list); CBS child; if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &child) || // CBS_len(&child) == 0 || // CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) { return false; } // Look for the first ECHConfig with supported parameters. while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) { ECHConfig ech_config; bool supported; if (!parse_ech_config(&child, &ech_config, &supported, /*all_extensions_mandatory=*/false)) { return false; } const EVP_HPKE_KEM *kem = EVP_hpke_x25519_hkdf_sha256(); const EVP_HPKE_KDF *kdf; const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead; if (supported && // ech_config.kem_id == EVP_HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 && select_ech_cipher_suite(&kdf, &aead, ech_config.cipher_suites)) { ScopedCBB info; static const uint8_t kInfoLabel[] = "tls ech"; // includes trailing NUL if (!CBB_init(info.get(), sizeof(kInfoLabel) + ech_config.raw.size()) || !CBB_add_bytes(info.get(), kInfoLabel, sizeof(kInfoLabel)) || !CBB_add_bytes(info.get(), ech_config.raw.data(), ech_config.raw.size())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } if (!EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_sender( hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get(), out_enc.data(), out_enc_len, out_enc.size(), kem, kdf, aead, ech_config.public_key.data(), ech_config.public_key.size(), CBB_data(info.get()), CBB_len(info.get())) || !hs->inner_transcript.Init()) { return false; } hs->selected_ech_config = MakeUnique(std::move(ech_config)); return hs->selected_ech_config != nullptr; } } } return true; } static size_t aead_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead) { #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): Having to adjust the overhead // everywhere is tedious. Change fuzzer mode to append a fake tag but still // otherwise be cleartext, refresh corpora, and then inline this function. return 0; #else return EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_HPKE_AEAD_aead(aead)); #endif } static size_t compute_extension_length(const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead, size_t enc_len, size_t in_len) { size_t ret = 4; // HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suite ret++; // uint8 config_id ret += 2 + enc_len; // opaque enc<1..2^16-1> ret += 2 + in_len + aead_overhead(aead); // opaque payload<1..2^16-1> return ret; } // random_size returns a random value between |min| and |max|, inclusive. static size_t random_size(size_t min, size_t max) { assert(min < max); size_t value; RAND_bytes(reinterpret_cast(&value), sizeof(value)); return value % (max - min + 1) + min; } static bool setup_ech_grease(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) { assert(!hs->selected_ech_config); if (hs->max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION || !hs->config->ech_grease_enabled) { return true; } const uint16_t kdf_id = EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256; const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = EVP_has_aes_hardware() ? EVP_hpke_aes_128_gcm() : EVP_hpke_chacha20_poly1305(); static_assert(ssl_grease_ech_config_id < sizeof(hs->grease_seed), "hs->grease_seed is too small"); uint8_t config_id = hs->grease_seed[ssl_grease_ech_config_id]; uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]; uint8_t private_key_unused[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN]; X25519_keypair(enc, private_key_unused); // To determine a plausible length for the payload, we estimate the size of a // typical EncodedClientHelloInner without resumption: // // 2+32+1+2 version, random, legacy_session_id, legacy_compression_methods // 2+4*2 cipher_suites (three TLS 1.3 ciphers, GREASE) // 2 extensions prefix // 4 ech_is_inner // 4+1+2*2 supported_versions (TLS 1.3, GREASE) // 4+1+10*2 outer_extensions (key_share, sigalgs, sct, alpn, // supported_groups, status_request, psk_key_exchange_modes, // compress_certificate, GREASE x2) // // The server_name extension has an overhead of 9 bytes. For now, arbitrarily // estimate maximum_name_length to be between 32 and 100 bytes. // // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): If the padding scheme changes to // also round the entire payload, adjust this to match. See // https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni/issues/433 const size_t overhead = aead_overhead(aead); const size_t in_len = random_size(128, 196); const size_t extension_len = compute_extension_length(aead, sizeof(enc), in_len); bssl::ScopedCBB cbb; CBB enc_cbb, payload_cbb; uint8_t *payload; if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), extension_len) || !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), kdf_id) || !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead)) || !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), config_id) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &enc_cbb) || !CBB_add_bytes(&enc_cbb, enc, sizeof(enc)) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &payload_cbb) || !CBB_add_space(&payload_cbb, &payload, in_len + overhead) || !RAND_bytes(payload, in_len + overhead) || !CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), &hs->ech_client_bytes)) { return false; } assert(hs->ech_client_bytes.size() == extension_len); return true; } bool ssl_encrypt_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span enc) { SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl; if (!hs->selected_ech_config) { return setup_ech_grease(hs); } // Construct ClientHelloInner and EncodedClientHelloInner. See // draft-ietf-tls-esni-10, sections 5.1 and 6.1. bssl::ScopedCBB cbb, encoded; CBB body; bool needs_psk_binder; bssl::Array hello_inner; if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || !CBB_init(encoded.get(), 256) || !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, &body, ssl_client_hello_inner, /*empty_session_id=*/false) || !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, encoded.get(), ssl_client_hello_inner, /*empty_session_id=*/true) || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, encoded.get(), &needs_psk_binder, ssl_client_hello_inner, CBB_len(&body), /*omit_ech_len=*/0) || !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &hello_inner)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } if (needs_psk_binder) { size_t binder_len; if (!tls13_write_psk_binder(hs, hs->inner_transcript, MakeSpan(hello_inner), &binder_len)) { return false; } // Also update the EncodedClientHelloInner. if (CBB_len(encoded.get()) < binder_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } OPENSSL_memcpy(const_cast(CBB_data(encoded.get())) + CBB_len(encoded.get()) - binder_len, hello_inner.data() + hello_inner.size() - binder_len, binder_len); } if (!hs->inner_transcript.Update(hello_inner)) { return false; } // Construct ClientHelloOuterAAD. See draft-ietf-tls-esni-10, section 5.2. // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): This ends up constructing the // ClientHelloOuter twice. Revisit this in the next draft, which uses a more // forgiving construction. const EVP_HPKE_KDF *kdf = EVP_HPKE_CTX_kdf(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get()); const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead = EVP_HPKE_CTX_aead(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get()); const size_t extension_len = compute_extension_length(aead, enc.size(), CBB_len(encoded.get())); bssl::ScopedCBB aad; CBB outer_hello; CBB enc_cbb; if (!CBB_init(aad.get(), 256) || !CBB_add_u16(aad.get(), EVP_HPKE_KDF_id(kdf)) || !CBB_add_u16(aad.get(), EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead)) || !CBB_add_u8(aad.get(), hs->selected_ech_config->config_id) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(aad.get(), &enc_cbb) || !CBB_add_bytes(&enc_cbb, enc.data(), enc.size()) || !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(aad.get(), &outer_hello) || !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, &outer_hello, ssl_client_hello_outer, /*empty_session_id=*/false) || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &outer_hello, /*out_encoded=*/nullptr, &needs_psk_binder, ssl_client_hello_outer, CBB_len(&outer_hello), /*omit_ech_len=*/4 + extension_len) || !CBB_flush(aad.get())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return false; } // ClientHelloOuter may not require a PSK binder. Otherwise, we have a // circular dependency. assert(!needs_psk_binder); CBB payload_cbb; if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), extension_len) || !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), EVP_HPKE_KDF_id(kdf)) || !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), EVP_HPKE_AEAD_id(aead)) || !CBB_add_u8(cbb.get(), hs->selected_ech_config->config_id) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &enc_cbb) || !CBB_add_bytes(&enc_cbb, enc.data(), enc.size()) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &payload_cbb)) { return false; } #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) // In fuzzer mode, the server expects a cleartext payload. if (!CBB_add_bytes(&payload_cbb, CBB_data(encoded.get()), CBB_len(encoded.get()))) { return false; } #else uint8_t *payload; size_t payload_len = CBB_len(encoded.get()) + EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_HPKE_AEAD_aead(aead)); if (!CBB_reserve(&payload_cbb, &payload, payload_len) || !EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(hs->ech_hpke_ctx.get(), payload, &payload_len, payload_len, CBB_data(encoded.get()), CBB_len(encoded.get()), CBB_data(aad.get()), CBB_len(aad.get())) || !CBB_did_write(&payload_cbb, payload_len)) { return false; } #endif // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE if (!CBBFinishArray(cbb.get(), &hs->ech_client_bytes)) { return false; } // The |aad| calculation relies on |extension_length| being correct. assert(hs->ech_client_bytes.size() == extension_len); return true; } BSSL_NAMESPACE_END using namespace bssl; void SSL_set_enable_ech_grease(SSL *ssl, int enable) { if (!ssl->config) { return; } ssl->config->ech_grease_enabled = !!enable; } int SSL_set1_ech_config_list(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *ech_config_list, size_t ech_config_list_len) { if (!ssl->config) { return 0; } auto span = MakeConstSpan(ech_config_list, ech_config_list_len); if (!ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list(span)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_CONFIG_LIST); return 0; } return ssl->config->client_ech_config_list.CopyFrom(span); } int SSL_marshal_ech_config(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, uint8_t config_id, const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key, const char *public_name, size_t max_name_len) { Span public_name_u8 = MakeConstSpan( reinterpret_cast(public_name), strlen(public_name)); if (!ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(public_name_u8)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_PUBLIC_NAME); return 0; } // See draft-ietf-tls-esni-10, section 4. ScopedCBB cbb; CBB contents, child; uint8_t *public_key; size_t public_key_len; if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 128) || // !CBB_add_u16(cbb.get(), kECHConfigVersion) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &contents) || !CBB_add_u8(&contents, config_id) || !CBB_add_u16(&contents, EVP_HPKE_KEM_id(EVP_HPKE_KEY_kem(key))) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &child) || !CBB_reserve(&child, &public_key, EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH) || !EVP_HPKE_KEY_public_key(key, public_key, &public_key_len, EVP_HPKE_MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH) || !CBB_did_write(&child, public_key_len) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &child) || // Write a default cipher suite configuration. !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256) || !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_AES_128_GCM) || !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256) || !CBB_add_u16(&child, EVP_HPKE_CHACHA20_POLY1305) || !CBB_add_u16(&contents, max_name_len) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &child) || !CBB_add_bytes(&child, public_name_u8.data(), public_name_u8.size()) || // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): Reserve some GREASE extensions // and include some. !CBB_add_u16(&contents, 0 /* no extensions */) || !CBB_finish(cbb.get(), out, out_len)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } SSL_ECH_KEYS *SSL_ECH_KEYS_new() { return New(); } void SSL_ECH_KEYS_up_ref(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) { CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&keys->references); } void SSL_ECH_KEYS_free(SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) { if (keys == nullptr || !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&keys->references)) { return; } keys->~ssl_ech_keys_st(); OPENSSL_free(keys); } int SSL_ECH_KEYS_add(SSL_ECH_KEYS *configs, int is_retry_config, const uint8_t *ech_config, size_t ech_config_len, const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key) { UniquePtr parsed_config = MakeUnique(); if (!parsed_config) { return 0; } if (!parsed_config->Init(MakeConstSpan(ech_config, ech_config_len), key, !!is_retry_config)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); return 0; } if (!configs->configs.Push(std::move(parsed_config))) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } int SSL_ECH_KEYS_has_duplicate_config_id(const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) { bool seen[256] = {false}; for (const auto &config : keys->configs) { if (seen[config->ech_config().config_id]) { return 1; } seen[config->ech_config().config_id] = true; } return 0; } int SSL_ECH_KEYS_marshal_retry_configs(const SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) { ScopedCBB cbb; CBB child; if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 128) || !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb.get(), &child)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } for (const auto &config : keys->configs) { if (config->is_retry_config() && !CBB_add_bytes(&child, config->ech_config().raw.data(), config->ech_config().raw.size())) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return false; } } return CBB_finish(cbb.get(), out, out_len); } int SSL_CTX_set1_ech_keys(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_ECH_KEYS *keys) { bool has_retry_config = false; for (const auto &config : keys->configs) { if (config->is_retry_config()) { has_retry_config = true; break; } } if (!has_retry_config) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_SERVER_WOULD_HAVE_NO_RETRY_CONFIGS); return 0; } UniquePtr owned_keys = UpRef(keys); MutexWriteLock lock(&ctx->lock); ctx->ech_keys.swap(owned_keys); return 1; } int SSL_ech_accepted(const SSL *ssl) { if (SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && !ssl->server) { // In the client early data state, we report properties as if the server // accepted early data. The server can only accept early data with // ClientHelloInner. return ssl->s3->hs->selected_ech_config != nullptr; } return ssl->s3->ech_accept; }